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CASE NOTES
than for bond filing would have avoided the pitfall of the Leich case is not
clear. Specification of purpose was a factor not unemphasized in a case
cited in the original hearing on the issue of "payrnent." 15 Nevertheless,
the court also considered other factors. In some few cases where the pre-
requisites are fulfilled for its application, Section 6501(d) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 will allow a "Request for Prompt Assessment." A
preliminary judicial or administrative ruling might be sought, to provide
certainty that a remittance was in response to an "asserted liability."'°
PETER E. PICHE
Trade Regulation—Federal Trade Commission Act—Gasoline-TBA
Tying Agreements as Unfair Competition.—Goodyear Tire el Rubber
Co. v. FTC;' Texaco, Inc. v. FTC.2—In the first of these two cases, the
Atlantic Refining Co. and the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. entered into a
written sales commission agreement by the terms of which Goodyear was to
pay Atlantic a ten per cent commission on all sales of Goodyear tires, bat-
teries, and accessories (TBA) to Atlantic dealers in return for Atlantic's
promoting Goodyear products to these dealers. The majority of Atlantic
dealers leased stations from Atlantic; the leases, in addition to being can-
cellable at the will of either party, contained provisions giving Atlantic control
over station advertising, hours, maintenance, and other particulars. The
FTC, after an original finding by a Hearing Examiner that Atlantic had
coerced its dealers to stock Goodyear TBA, entered a sweeping order, not
only upholding this ruling, but also condemning the whole sales commission
system as a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Acts
In addition, the Commission prohibited both Goodyear and Atlantic from
entering into any future similar agreements with any other companies. The
court, affirming the FTC, HELD: Apart from overt coercive methods, At-
lantic had sufficient economic power over its dealers to force their purchase
of sponsored TBA; and, considered in the context of this economic power,
the sales commission contracts were, in effect, tying arrangements and illegal
since a substantial amount of commerce had been affected.
In Texaco, sales commission agreements were again involved, here be-
15 Atlantic Oil Producing Co. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 766 (Ct. CI. 1940).
Discussion of the meaning of the term, "payment" has been purposely avoided in this
note, as the matter was not directly in question. It should be pointed out, however, that
"payment" and "asserted liability" may, in some cases, be constituted by similar circum-
stances when Internal Revenue Service activity is in issue. For an excellent discussion of
the term, "payment" see, Alexander, Overpayments of Taxes or Government Investment
at Six Per Cent: The Problem of Allowance of Interest, 7 Tax L. Rev. 231 (1952).
16 Emmanuel, Federal Tax Refund Procedures, 5 U. Fla. L. Rev. 133 (1952); Stark,
Claims for Refund of Federal Taxes, 41 Iowa L. Rev. 496 (1956).
1 331 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1964).
2 Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) II 71189 (D.C. Cir. July 30, 1964).
3 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1958): "Unfair methods
of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are
declared unlawful."
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tween Texaco and the B. F. Goodrich Co., a TBA manufacturer and dis-
tributor. As in Goodyear, cancellable leases existed between Texaco and its
dealers, coercion was found at the original hearing, and the Commission
entered a broad decree against Texaco and B. F. Goodrich identical with
the Goodyear decree. The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, how-
ever, reversing the Commission, HELD: There was not substantial evidence
on the record as a whole to support the conclusion that Texaco had sufficient
economic power over its dealers to cause the purchase of sponsored TBA
without the use of overt coercion.
Although, superficially, the Texaco decision seems to rest on the pro-
cedural basis of insufficient evidence, in fact Texaco's rationale, insofar as it
denies' the necessary inference of coercive economic power from the dealer-
gasoline company relationship without showing particular instances of coer-
cion, directly conflicts with Goodyear. Without this inference, the broad
order of Goodyear, prohibiting the Goodyear Co. from forming future sales
commission agreements with any gasoline company, cannot stand.
The Goodyear court found that the sales commission system, interwoven
as it was with Atlantic's coercive economic control over its dealers, was, in
effect, a tying arrangement.4 The court further determined that this arrange-
ment met the "substantiality of economic effect on commerce" test of
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States5 in that a substantial amount of com-
merce had been affected and Atlantic was powerful enough in the service
station market to restrain a substantial amount of commerce in TBA. The
"tying" here, of gasoline to TBA, really occurs at the level of the Atlantic-
dealer relationship. Atlantic pressures its dealers, through economic threats,
to agree to buy only Goodyear TBA and thus effectively refuses the dealers
access to the tying product (gasoline) unless they also agree to purchase the
tied product, TBA.
Dealers' agreements, either written or oral, to purchase sponsored TBA
exclusively or at least substantially, when obtained through overt threats
and coercion by their gasoline suppliers and lessors, have been consistently
condemned as violating antitrust laws.°
Such agreements need not even be express, but may be implied from a
course of dealing between the parties? In United States v. Sun Oil Co., 8 al-
though dealers were never required to enter into any oral or written con-
4
 A tying arrangement is defined as an "agreement by a party to sell one product
but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product,
or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier."
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). On tying agreements gen-
erally, see Times-Picayune Pub, Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) ; International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
5 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, supra note 4, at 6.
6 Standard Oil Co. v. United' States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (written requirements
contract) ; United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951),
aff'd, 343 U.S. 922 (1953). See also Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (con-
signment agreement giving Union right to fix prices).
• McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Sup. CO., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959). See
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
• 176 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
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tracts concerning TBA, it was held that Sun Oil, through the use of coercive
tactics such as threats of cancelling leases or ceasing gasoline deliveries, had
effectively forced the dealers into a tacit agreement not to sell competing
TBA. In Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co.,° cited by the Goodyear court, Osborn
sought damages for cancellation of his lease, caused by his failure to stock
sponsored TBA despite Sinclair's efforts under a sales commission agreement
with Goodyear. Even without a written agreement between Osborn and Sin-
clair, the court found an illegal tie-in, and hence an antitrust violation, result-
ing from Sinclair's coercion of dealers to carry substantial amounts of
Goodyear TBA.
Had the Goodyear court based its decision on overt coercion, it would
have been in agreement with these previous decisions.n There were many
instances of overt coercion found by the court in Goodyear: dealers testified
to threats of lease cancellation; dealers were badgered by Atlantic salesmen
whose commission was partially derived from TBA sales and whose failure
to recommend that leases be renewed was tantamount to cancellation; whole-
salers competing with the Goodyear supply points stated that dealers felt
themselves bound to buy only Goodyear TBA; at the original hearing, a
finding was made that Atlantic had openly coerced its dealers.
Hence, the Goodyear court might have found that the sales commission
agreement, operating as it did in this context of coercion, was, in effect, an
illegal tying arrangement. Further, this finding of coercion might have been
sufficient even to support the broad order against Atlantic, on the theory that
Atlantic had not given the Commission any indication that coercion would
not continue under future similar agreements. It is generally held that the
FTC is not limited to prohibiting practices " 'in the precise form' existing
in the past,"11 nor necessarily limited in the scope of its decrees to the im-
mediate parties to the action.12
An order based merely on coercion, however, could not have supported
the broad prohibition placed on Goodyear, the other party to the agreement.
9 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960). The Osborn court, however, did not rely solely on
a tacit agreement by the dealer to carry sponsored TBA brought on by coercion. Osborn,
having lost one lease for failure to purchase sufficient amounts of Goodyear TBA,
entered into an oral agreement to take a definite amount of TBA before his second,
subsequently cancelled, lease was given. Moreover, the Osborn court did not decide the
legality of the Sinclair—Goodyear sales commission contract.
10 Even though the action in Goodyear was brought under Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1958),
while most tying agreement cases are treated as violating Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 38
Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958), or Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209
(1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958), this is of minor importance since Section 5
of FTCA includes both Clayton and Sherman Act violations. FTC v. Cement Institute,
333 U.S. 683 (1947); Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
Generally, in fact, courts consider this section as also including prohibition of those
trade methods which, if unchecked, could develop into violations of the Clayton or
Sherman Acts or which could achieve the same anticompetitive effects by a means not
specifically condemned by either of these acts. See, e.g., FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S.
643 (1931).
11 FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 392 (1959) ; FTC v. Nat'l Lead Co., 352
U.S. 419 (1957); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952).
12 FTC v. Cement Institute, supra note 10, at 728-29.
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Such an order would have to presume either that every oil company with
which Goodyear might make an agreement would engage in illegal coercion
of its dealers, or that every such sales commission contract is, in itself, and
apart from the Atlantic-dealer relations, illegal.
Perhaps the Goodyear court could have found sufficient anti-competitive
effects, aside from dealer coercion, to render this particular sales commission
agreement illegal. Atlantic had, for example, in addition to the Goodyear
contract, a similar contract with Firestone. Firestone and Goodyear were each
assigned different and exclusive areas of the Atlantic service station market,
thus eliminating competition between the two in these districts. Agreements
between competitors resulting in horizontal division of competitive markets
have been condemned as violations of the Sherman Act," and such a con-
spiracy might have been found in these two agreements. The court also
mentioned that the contract called for specific and exclusive dealer supply
points, at which Atlantic dealers had to purchase all their Goodyear products,
eliminating the Atlantic stations from the market of the other Goodyear
wholesalers and retailers.
Neither of these effects, however, is a necessary part of the sales com-
mission system. The court in Goodyear admitted that the sales commission
contract, in itself, has no tying features. "Only when the contract is con-
sidered contextually with the oil company-dealer relationship .. . does its
tying feature emerge." 14
Thus, in order to support the order against Goodyear, the court linked
the sales commission contract not to specific instances of coercion but to the
inherent economic control of the gasoline company over its lessee-dealers.
By basing this economic control simply on the lessor-lessee relationship under
a short-term, easily cancellable lease, and the dealer's necessary dependence
on the oil company for his station and equipment, the dealer's economic
dependence on his lessor and consequent economic "serfdom"" could be
presumed to exist, without any showing of actual instances of coercion,
wherever the basic lease arrangement existed. Such an arrangement is cer-
tainly the one employed by the greater number of gasoline companies."
Since, therefore, any sates commission contract that Goodyear entered into
with a gasoline company would have to operate in this general climate of
economic dependence, the Commission decreed, and the court affirmed, that
Goodyear avoid all such contracts.
It is precisely this inference of economic control that Texaco denies.
The Texaco court found that the Commission's contentions that the sales
15
 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) ; United States
v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) .
14
 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, supra note 1, at 402.
15
 "Ostensibly, they are independent businessmen; but behind the legalistic facade
of independence, there exists a servitude. . . . [Ilt is evident that the service station
dealer is more of an economic serf than a businessman. • . ." Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. v. FTC, supra note 1, at 400.
15 Besides the two principal cases, similar systems were found to exist in Simpson
v. Union Oil Co., supra note 6; United States v. Sun Oil Co., supra note 8; United




commission contracts were illegal were based on the conclusion that Texaco
had sufficient economic power over its dealers to cause them to purchase
substantial TBA "even without the use of overt coercive tactics."" The
court then determined that there was not "substantial evidence on the record
as a whole to sustain that conclusion" 18 and dismissed." Admittedly, the
opinion's report of what facts were on the record is sparse. The court,
however, did state that merely because Texaco was a large corporation, and
the dealers small businessmen, this did not demonstrate controlling economic
power.2°
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Washington provided an insight into
the contents of the record. He listed, for example, one year leases, terminable
on ten days' notice, contractual control by Texaco over the appearance and
maintenance of the stations, and the high personal investments of lessees in
their stations.21
 Disagreeing with the majority, Judge Washington felt that
the court could have used the legal doctrines of Goodyear and Firestone22
coupled with facts from the Hearing Examiner's record and upheld the decrees
against B. F. Goodrich and Texaco.28
The Texaco court concluded that the Commission had shown neither
economic power nor coercion (since the Commission had explicitly stated
that it was not basing its order on the Examiner's initial finding of coercion),
and that "it may not be presumed that either will exist in future similar
situations."24
 This last remark indicates the opinion of the Texaco court that
each sales commission contract must be examined in the specific fact situation
in which it exists, as being between a particular gasoline company and a
particular TBA distributor. The Texaco court further stated that the Com-
mission's sweeping order against Goodrich either attributed to all oil com-
panies sufficient economic control over their dealers to restrain their market
freedom, or implied that sales commission agreements are inherently illegal.
As to inherent economic control, the court held that this had to be shown by
sufficient evidence "on the record." 25 Thus, Texaco requires a searching in
each case for this economic power and refuses to infer it from the general
oil company-dealer economic structure. The court further held that sales coin-
17
 Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 2, at 79731.
la Ibid.
10
 The court might have simply reversed this case and remanded to the Commission
for a de novo consideration on other grounds, stemming from a speech made by the
Commission Chairman prior to the Texaco opinion in which he condemned sales commis-
sion agreements as illegal, mentioning both Texaco and B. F. Goodrich by name. Instead,
they considered the evidence as a whole and dismissed.
20
 Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 2, at 79732. Compare with the view of the
Goodyear court, supra note 15.
21
 Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 2, at 79735-36.
22 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., supra note 16.
23
 Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 2, at 79736. The Commission intended, in fact,
to proceed on the Goodyear theory, for the court quoted the Commission as saying, "The
legal principles relevant to this decision ... are set forth at length in the opinions of
the Commission in Goodyear . . . and Firestone." Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 2,
at 79730.
24 Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 2, at 79733.
25 Id. at 79732.
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mission agreements were not necessarily illegal unless they constituted un-
fair competition." In each case, then, the unfairness must be shown.
The Texaco view is more in accord with the traditional curbs placed on
the injunctive power of the FTC. The order should not be any broader than
is necessary to prohibit similar illegal acts in the future," nor should its
enforcement forbid methods of competition that do not unfairly restrain
trade.28
 Rather, it should be effective at the level at which the restraint
takes place. As Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in International Salt Co.
v. United States,29
 said concerning the rule of FTC v. Royal Milling Co."
and Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 31
[T]he law .. . respeCts the wisdom of not burning even part of a
house in order to roast a pig.... The Government is not entitled to
a provision in the decree which can be justified only on some
indication . . . that appellant's past shows a devious temper which
needs to be hobbled by withdrawing a conceded legal right. 82
The Commission, in fact, in two recent cases," agreed to consent orders
which ordered a franchisor to cease coercing his dealers to carry a sponsored
product but did not outlaw the franchisor's sales commission plan.
In conclusion, the Texaco court refuses to use economic power to
prospectively prohibit all future sales commission agreements between the
TBA supplier and any gasoline company, as the Goodyear court did. These
restraints placed by Texaco on the prohibitive scope of the FTC's decrees
are more in agreement with the traditional views of that agency's powers.
The Goodyear decision, in so far as it restrains Goodyear from any further
competition for sales commission agreements, may be a more serious restraint
of trade than the sales commission system it was intended to eliminate.
GEORGE M. DOHERTY
Trade Regulation—Lanham Trade-Mark Act—Right to Registration
for Bottle Configuration on Principal Register During Life of Design
Patent.—Application of Mogen David Wine Corp.1—Mogen David Wine
Corporation was the holder of a design patent on a bottle configuration and
applied for trademark registration of the configuration on the principal
26 Ibid.
27 See FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933) ; Swanee Paper Corp. v.
FTC, 291 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961) ; Virginia Excelsior Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 256 F.2d 538
(4th Cir. 1958).
28 FTC v. Cement Institute, supra note 10, at 727.
29 Supra note 4.
38 Supra note 27.
81 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
82 International Salt Co. v. United States, supra note 4, at 403, 405.
33 O.K. Rubber Welders, Inc. and the B. .F. Goodrich Co., 1964 FTC Complaints,
Orders, Stipulations Q 16953 (July 3, 1964) at 22014; Kaiser Jeep Corp., 1964 FTC
Complaints, Orders, Stipulations 11 16891 (April 27, 1964) at 21927.
1 51 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 4, 328 F.2d 925 (1964).
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